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OKLAHOMA'S IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE-
IS DUE PROCESS DUE?
Glenn P. Bernstein
The increasing number of alcohol related road accidents and the
discovery of ever more reliable and sophisticated means of detecting
degrees of intoxication, have created new incentives and solutions for
state legislatures concerned with public road safety. Oklahoma, along
with nearly all of the states, has enacted one form of the so-called im-
plied consent statute to deal with the problem.' The essential feature
of these statutes, put simply, is that any person who operates a motor
vehicle upon the public roads impliedly consents to having a chemical
blood-alcohol test performed upon his person by any law enforcement
officer who has reasonable grounds to believe the motorist was driving
while intoxicated (DWI). A refusal to submit to the test or a with-
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 751. See also ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 154 (Supp. 1971);
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (1970); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (Supp. 1969-70);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1969); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13353 (1971); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5-30 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (1967);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1625.1 (Supp. 1972); HA-
WAI REv. STAT. § 286-151 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §
47-2003c (Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. § 32113.3 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-1001 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 186.565 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 32.6611
(Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art.
66/, § 6-205.1 (Cune. Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24 (Supp. 1972);
MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 257.625a (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 169.123 (Supp.
1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8175-01 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.441 (Supp.
1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32-2142.1 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-
727.03 (1960); NEV. REv. STAT. § 484.385 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262-
A: 69-a (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-22-2.6 (1972); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1972); OHIO REV, CODE
ANN. 4511.191 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 483-634 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 624.1 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-27-2.1 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-
344 (Supp. 1972); S.D. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1972); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 59-1045 (Supp. 1972); TEx. PENAL CODE art. 802f (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-6-44.10 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1188 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-
55.1 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-247.2 (Supp. 1971).
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drawal of consent subjects the driver to a summary license revocation
for a fixed period of time. While the ostensible function of these laws
is to protect the public from the perils of the drunken driver, more
practically the process is a means of facilitating the gathering of evi-
dence against a DWI defendant.
Effective only since 1969, the Oklahoma version is a relative new-
comer on the implied consent scene,2 but already it has come under
numerous attacks. Primarily, the assaults have challenged its validity
in the constitutional sense, covering such areas as self-incrimination,
search and seizure, right to counsel, due process and equal protection
under the law.3
It will be the scope and purpose of this comment to examine these
areas of conflict and to indicate other realized or potential problem
areas in the Oklahoma implied consent statute. This discussion will
be confined to the civil aspects of the statute which are more novel,
with only necessary references to the criminal ramifications of the law.
The underlying justification for the current implied consent enact-
ments is that they are a reasonable regulation of motorists within the
state pursuant to the state's police power.4  "The dangers imposed by
the drinking driver to the vast number of persons using the highways
are such that they warrant a slight infringement upon the liberty of the
individual."
Another justification suggested by proponents of implied consent
statutes is that driving on state regulated roads is not a right, but merely
2. New York was the first to enact an implied consent statute as far back as 1954.
It was held unconstitutional in Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 2d 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116
(Sup. Ct. 1954). Amended to include added procedural requirements, it was later up-
held in Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 2d 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
3. Most courts have rejected the contentions that implied consent statutes:
(1) infringe on the guarantee against self-incrimination. Lee v. State, 187 Kan.
566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Prucha v. Dap't of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.
2d 75 (1961).
(2) violate due process of law. Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1967);
Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 178, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
(3) deprive a licensee of equal protection. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 2d 43,
127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
(4) permit an unreasonable search and seizure. Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S.
432 (1957).
(5) interfere with the right to counsel. 'Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181
N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962).
4. The police power issue was settled in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
That case upheld a state statute providing that nonresident motorists had impliedly given
their consent to the appointment of a state agent for service of process by their accept-
ance of the privilege of driving on the state regulated highways and roads.
5. Comment, Florida's "Implied Consent" Statute: Chemical Tests for Intoxi-
cated Drivers, 22 U. MAmi L. REv. 698, 706 (1968).
19751
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a privilege which may be granted on terms and conditions considered
reasonable by the state.'
The initial statute in the Oklahoma implied consent scheme is sec-
tion 751 of title 47.7 This section provides that the apprehended driver
may elect which of the two chemical tests offered in Oklahoma shall
be performed on him.8 The most persistent point of contention here
centers around the issues raised by the self-incrimination prohibition
in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.9
The United States Supreme Court in Shmerber v. California,"0
a DWI case where a police-directed physician extracted a blood sample
from the defendant over his objection, held that the right against self
incrimination
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature and that the with-
drawal of blood and use of the analysis in question did not
involve compulsion to these ends. 1 (emphasis added).
This statement is significant in the examination of the Oklahoma situa-
tion today.
The coverage of self-incrimination in article II, section 21 of the
Oklahoma Constitution differs from the federal fifth amendment and
presents an added twist to the controversy. 12 In a recent case involving
the Oklahoma implied consent statute, the court took notice of the
6. The fact that the test may well exculpate the operator as well as incriminate
him is a less often used explanation for the validity of these statutes. See, e.g., Robert-
son v. State ex rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1972).
7. The statute states in full:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways or streets
of this state shall be deemed to have given consent subject to the provisions of
this act to a chemical test or tests of his blood or breath, at the election of the
person proposed to be tested, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic con-
tent of his blood. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a
law enforcement officer after having arrested a person and having reasonable
grounds to believe the person driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon the public highways was under the influence of alcoholic or intox-
icating liquor.
8. This presumes that the driver has already made another more critical election,
i.e., to submit to a chemical test in the first place. Some states do not offer the motorist
a choice of tests. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1969) (law enforcement
agency responsible for the arrest designates which of a blood, breath, or urine test shall
be taken).
9. The fifth amendment provides in part: "[N]or shall [the accused] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
11. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
12. "No person shall be compelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate
him. .. ." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21.
[Vol. 10:398
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broader, more protective nature of this language against self-incrimina-
tion and stated: "It is therefore settled in this jurisdiction that non-
testimonial evidence such as a test of defendants' blood for intoxication
falls within the scope of the self-incrimination prohibition.""3  This is
to say that no distinction between physical and testimonial evidence of
self-incrimination is made in Oklahoma.
The determinative factor then remains the matter of compulsion.
In the case of Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 4 the court did not consider the
threat of a six-month summary license revocation for a refusal to accede
to a chemical test a means of compulsion. The motorist "is not forced
to forfeit one right in order to exercise another since operating a motor
vehicle is a privilege, not a right, which may be condidtioned."'1 The
court also added that any idea that compulsion was involved in this stat-
ute was clearly refuted by the motorist's ability to elect whether or not
to take the test.'
However, even in Oklahoma there is some disagreement on the
matter of compulsion in section 751. In R. W. Rine Drilling v.
Ferguson,'7 the court, in commenting upon the degree of indepen-
dence with which the operator decided to submit to the test said, "In
view of the punitive result of failing to give one's consent to the
procurement and testing of his blood, . it could hardly be said that
his consent was voluntary."' 8
The United States Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities
to discuss this issue of compulsion by threat of penalty in the context
of the fifth amendment. Notably, in Garity v. State'0 and Spevack v.
Kleine the Court concluded that the states could not condition the con-
13. Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316, 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). Accord,
Stewart v. State, 435 P.2d 191 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967); Spencer v. State, 404 P.2d
46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Lorenz v. State, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965).
But see Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) where the court held
that the Texas self-incrimination provision, very similar to Oklahoma's, was not to be
construed differently than the federal fifth amendment.
14. 491 P.2d 316 (Oka. Crim. App. 1971).
15. 491 P.2d at 318. On the matter of waiver of constitutional rights in this area
see Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099 at 1103 (Okla. 1972); and Prucha
v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1961).
16. 491 P.2d at 318.
17. 496 P.2d 1169 (Okla. 1972).
18. Id. at 1170.
19. 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (police officers warned in a state traffic ticket "fixing"
investigation that answers to inquiries might be used against them but that a refusal to
answer might also subject them to removal from office).
20. 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney disbarred in a disciplinary proceeding for proof
of misconduct for his failure to produce incriminating financial records).
1975]
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tinuation of a person's livelihood upon his willingness to incriminate
himself in a state investigation. The alternatives given to the men,
either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit their jobs, constituted
"compulsion" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. In the same
vein, critics suggest that a similar awkward and weighty decision is
placed upon the apprehended motorist. For him the right to drive, like
his chosen occupation, may be so intimate an ingredient of his liberty
and protection of property that the threat of a summary six-month revo-
cation is very measurable compulsion indeed. In many instances driv-
ing may constitute the individual's livelihood or be an integral part
thereof. In such cases it seems imparative to apply the Garity and
Spevack reasoning.2 1
Despite this line of attack, advocates of the statutes consistently
return to their base proposition: that driving is not a right which is
protected by the Constitution in the sense to which Garity and Spevack
apply. This stand, grounded as it is upon the distinction between
"right" and "privilege," has been seriously undermined by recent
Supreme Court decisions showing a reluctance to recognize even the
semantical nature of the distinction.22 In Bell v. Burson,23 the Court
stated: "[Rielevant constitutional restraints limit state power to termi-
nate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right'
or a 'privilege'. "24
Apart from the broad constitutional issues outlined above, section
751 presents some practical procedural problems that need to be
examined. The suspected driver must be under arrest when the
chemical tests are administered in order for the test results to be admis-
sible. Laboratory results of tests of blood samples taken prior to an
21. In the case of In re Finley, 503 P.2d 1273 (Okla. 1973), a salesman for an
oil field tool company alleged in defense of his refusal, that the revocation worked a
great hardship upon him and his family, but the court upheld the penalty. See discus-
sion of OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 755 (1971), infra.
22. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), the Court stated:
"mhe Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process
rights." In Graham v. Richardson, 503 U.S. 365, 374 (1971), the Court remarked:
"This Court has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a gov-
ernmental beneft is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'." See also Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
23. 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (a state statute which provided that the motor vehicle reg-
istration and license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended
unless he posts security for the amount of damages claimed by the aggrieved party and
which excludes any consideration of fault or responsibility for the accident at a pre-sus-
pension hearing, was held violative of procedural due process).
24. Id. at 539,
[Vol. 10:398
5
Bernstein: Oklahoma's Implied Consent Statute--Is Due Process Due
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
actual arrest have generally been ruled inadmissible in a criminal
action.25 Ordinarily, a search and seizure, which is what the chemical
testing process amounts to, is proper only when performed incident to
a valid arrest or search warrant. However, since in implied consent
cases the arrest is usually for a misdemeanor committed in the presence
of a law officer, the issue of the validity of the arrest is seldom decisive
in these cases. Oklahoma has no decisions relating to arrest in the im-
plied consent field as yet, but it is safe to assume that when the matter
finally presents itself, the courts will construe the "arrest" required by
section 751 to mean "lawful arrest with probable cause.
'26
The Oklahoma statute permits the chemical tests to be performed
only on the driver's breath or blood, at his election.27  By contrast,
several other states offer, in addition to a blood or breath test option,
tests upon the person's urine and/or saliva."' These further options
are relevant when, for some religious or health related reason, a driver
cannot submit to a test of his blood 0 and distrusts or otherwise feels
he cannot submit to a simple breathalyzer test. It seems an unneces-
sary restriction to limit the motorist in Oklahoma to just a blood or
breath test. At the very least Oklahoma should amend its statute to
provide a simple urine analysis option. One argument in favor of re-
taining the alternatives that we have now is that these substances are
among the easiest to obtain from the submitting operator-an impor-
tant consideration inasmuch as the statute requires that the test speci-
men be obtained within two hours of the arrest.30
25. Shores v. State, 233 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1970); State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 226
A.2d 873 (1967); State v. Baker, 184 Neb. 724, 171 N.W.2d 798 (1969).
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 754 (1971) prescribes that the arrest shall be a proper
issue for contest at the hearing for the license revokee. See Holland v. Parker, 354 F.
Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973); Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 2d 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
27. Phares v. Dep't of Public Safety, 507 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1972).
28. Some states offering tests on the driver's blood, breath, and urine are: Alabama,
New York, Arizona, Arkansas, California, South Dakota, and Colorado. In addition,
the New York version also includes the option of a saliva test and the South Dakota
statute broadly includes "any other bodily substances." N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
29. In Prucha, the plaintiff alleged a heart condition to avoid taking the blood test
but tha court held that his steadfast refusal was not excusable because he could have
submitted to a urine analysis. In the Connecticut statute, where the driver may elect
a blood or breath test, there is a proviso preventing the imposition of a revocation for
refusal if th- driver's physical condition is such that, according to compatent medical
advice, such test would be inadvisable. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (1967).
30. OiKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 756(e) (which will not ba discussed in this comment)
states: "To be admissible such evidence must first be qualified by establishing that such
specimen was obtained from the subject within not more than two (2) hours of the ar-
rest of the subject."
1975]
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Another potential source of litigation in Oklahoma is the absence
of any requirement that the arresting officer, while instructing the
motorist as to his options, also warn him of the penal consequences of
a refusal to submit to a chemical test. In view of the relatively unique
character of the law confronting the driver, such a warning would seem
a simple and helpful bit of information that would enable the motorist
to make a more intelligent election and at the same time present a mini-
mal threat to the overall enforceability and effectiveness of the statute.
Such a warning is a statutory requirement in California, New York,
Alaska, Alabama, Nebraska, Kentucky and Colorado.A Colorado's
statute is constructed in a particularly interesting manner:
At the time of making such request [to submit to a test] the
officer orally, and by written notice, which written notice shall
be in both English and Spanish, . . . shall inform the person
arrested of his rights under the law and the probable conse-
quences of a refusal to submit to such a test.
While the proposition that all persons are presumed to know the law
is fixed in our jurisprudential thinking, 32 even in Oklahoma where the
lack of warning is made expressly irrelevant to the implied consent pro-
ceedings, 33 state law enforcement figures have actually given warnings
to their arrestees on occasion. 34
Several procedural statutes accompany the Oklahoma implied con-
sent act. The first of these, section 752 of title 47,35 outlines the pro-
31. Statutes cited note 1 supra.
32. 29 AM. Jur. 2D Evidence § 211 (1967).
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 754 (1971) states in part: "Whether the person was in-
formed that his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied if he refused to submit
to the test or test(s) shall not be an issue."
34. The case reports of Phares v. Dep't of Public Safety, 507 P.2d 1225 (Oka.
1972) and Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) indicate that
.iuch warnings were in fact given to the apprehended motorists.
35. The statute states in full:
Only a licensed medical doctor, osteopathic physician, qualified technician,
technologist, or registered nurse acting at the request of a law enforcement of-
ficer may withdraw blood for purpose of determining the alcoholic content
therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of breath specimens. The
person tested may have a physician or a qualified technician, chemist, regis-
tered nurse, or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemi-
cal test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law en-
forcement officer, providing the specimen for testing is obtained at the time or
is an aliquot of that obtained by the law enforcement officer, and provided fur-
ther that said aliquot specimen may be delivered to any person qualified to
analyze such specimens as the subject may designate, and provided further that
such subject makes arrangements for delivery thereof, in order for any evidence
under this act to be admissible. The failure or inability to obtain an additional
test by a person shall not preclude the admission of the test or tests taken at
the direction of a law enforcement officer. The blood specimen shall be tested
to determine the alcoholic content therein, and also for the presence of any
other substances which might have influenced the behavior of the subject if he
7
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cedures for the blood-alcohol test(s) and other related matters. This
section offers the driver in custody reasonable safeguards in the actual
administration of the chemical tests. The portion of the statute permit-
ting the driver to provide his own additional test should be read with
the understanding that to be admissible the driver's own sample must
be obtained as nearly as possible at the same time as the police
specimen was procured and that section 756(e) of the statute requires
that all the tests be administered within two hours of the arrest. The
Oklahoma litigation under this section has been minimal and concerned
mostly with the qualifications of the chemical test administrators. 6
The last provision of section 752 prohibits the admission of the
chemical test results into evidence in civil actions. A possible expla-
nation for this is that the only civil proceeding anticipated as a result
of the implied consent statute is a revocation hearing at the request of
the motorist. At that hearing, the results of the test either for or
against the driver, are irrelevant because the revocation penalty is im-
posed only for his refusal to submit to a chemical test and has nothing
to do with the possible criminal proceeding for DWI.
Ironically, the only application of this particular portion of section
752 was not in a revocation hearing, but rather in a workmen's compen-
sation proceeding before a state industrial court. In that matter,
because the employee was arrested and tested pursuant to the implied
consent statute, the court held that it was a civil tribunal within the
meaning of the prohibition and excluded the evidence of the test results
even though intoxication is a bar to certain remedies under the work-
men's compensation statute.
37
Section 753 is a procedural statute controlling the consequences
of a refusal to submit to a chemical test.3 8  This section has been the
so requests. A written report of the results including full information concern-
ing the test or tests taken at the direction of a law enforcement otfficer shall be
made available to the subject. The results of the test or tests as provided for
herein shall not b- admissible in civil actions. (emphasis added).
36. McGuire v. State, 504 P.2d 1247 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (a practical nurse
with 16 years of experience, including the taking of blood samples, was a "qualified tech-
nician" under the statute); Johnson v. State, 487 P.2d 1005 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)
(a police officer licensed by tha state with 40 hours of training connected with the
breathalyzer device was qualified to testify as to the results of the test). Other sources
dealing in depth with this subject area include: R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DIV-
aNG CASES chs. 15-24 (3d ed. 1972); C. Tessmer, Transcript Cross Examination of
Breathalyzer Operator & Supervisor, and Breath Program, TExAs CRiM. DEFENSE LAW-
YERS ASS'N, July 10, 1972.
37. 496 P.2d 1169 (Okla. 1972).
38. The statute provides:
If a conscious person under arrest refuses to submit to chemical testing, none
shall be given, but the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety, upon the re-
19751
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greatest source of litigation in Oklahoma and similar renditions across
the nation have also been subject to repeated attacks. The complaint
most often filed is that this section is violative of fourteenth amendment
due process in that the license revocation takes place without a prior
notice or hearing for the motorist. Many of the states that have re-
jeced the due process argument and upheld their implied consent stat-
utes have placed considerable reliance on the reasoning that a driver's
license is not a property right and so is not subject to the fourteenth
amendment.40 "A driver's license is not a contract or a property right
in the constitutional sense, and therefore its revocation does not consti-
tute the taking of property. '41
It is apparent that once again, the controversy rages over the right-
privilege battleground. No implied consent case has yet reached the
Supreme Court for determination of the issue of due process, but re-
cently the Court did decide a case concerning a revocation penalty in
a motor vehicle statute on the basis of due process.42  In Bell v. Bur-
son,43 the Court considered a statute which provided that the motor
vehicle registration and the driver's license of an uninsured motorist
involved in an accident would be suspended unless he posted security
for the amount of damages claimed by the aggrieved party and which
excluded any consideration of fault or responsibility for the accident
at a pre-susp-nsion hearing. The Court found the statute violative of
procedural due process. This case is consistent with the current trend
of due process decisions in the Court.44  The Bell Court further stated
ceipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer that he had reasonable
grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or intoxicating liquor, and that the person has refused to sub-
mit to the test or tests, shall revoke his license to drive and any nonresident
operating privileges for a period of six months; or if the person is a resident
without a license or a permit to operate a motor vehicle in this state, the Okla-
homa Commissioner of Public Safety shall deny to the person the issuance of a
license or permit for a period of six months after the date of the alleged viola-
tion, subject to review as hereinafter provided.
39. The fourteenth amendment states in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
withn its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
40. This is the fundamental reasoning behind the decision in Robertson v. State ex.
rel. Lester, 501 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1972).
41. 501 P.2d at 1101.
42. The Supreme Court has so far declined to hear the implied consent cases that
have come before it on appeal. People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972); Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962).
43. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
44. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) (no termination of welfare benefits
without prior notice and adversary hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (no
[Vol. 10:398
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that possession of a diver's license involves "important interests of the
licensees," that may not be terminated except in accordance with pro-
cedural due process of law, which traditionally has included at the very
minimum the right to notice: and an opportunity to be heard.45
There is every reason to afford due process as outlined in Bell
in implied consent cases and only a tenuous basis for refusing to do
SO. 40  One rationale for refusing a hearing is the so-called "emergency"
doctrine. This excuses the denial of due process where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the fact. The "emergency" doctrine has been successfully
argued in several non-implied consent cases, 7 and it applied to implied
consent situations on the premise that a drunken driver poses such an
immediate threat to the safety of the community that a summary, pre-
hearing revocation is within the police power of the state, disregarding
any matter of due process. However, the application fails in the im-
plied consent field because the criterion for revocation under these stat-
utes is not drunkenness but rather a mere refusal to take the chemical
test. Therefore, in order for the "emergency" doctrine to be con-
sidered valid here, there must be a conclusive presumption that all
those who refuse to submit to a test are dangerously drunk and a threat
to the public. Such a supposition cannot rationally be made the foun-
dation of a statute that so gravely affects the lives of those it ensnares.
Recently, in Chavez v. Campbell,4 a federal district court in
Arizona found that state's implied consent law unconstitutional in light
of the Bell decision. The rationale in Chavez was a combined due
process-equal protection attack that made the "emergency" doctrine
appear even more inappropriate to the implied consent field. The
court first noted that at that time in Arizona, a first time conviction
pre-judgment replevins without prior notice and an adversary hearing); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (no pre-judgment garnishments without
prior notice and adversary hearing).
45. 402 U.S. at 539, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
46. The California version of implied consent procedure goes about as far as any
statute in affording due process to the operator. It requires the state agency to give
immediate notice to the driver of his suspension but this suspension is stayed and does
not become effective until 10 days after the giving of notice. At this time the motorist
must request a hearing which further operates to stay the penalty another 15 days, dur-
ing wh'ch time it is the respons'bility of the agency to arrange a hearing. If they
fail in this, the suspension is indefinitely stayed until such time as a hearing is provided.
See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353 (1971).
47. Ewing v. Mytinger, 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414 (1944).
48. No. CIV.-73-163 Phx WEC, (D. Ariz.), (decided July 30, 1973).
1975]
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss3/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
for DWI did not require a mandatory license revocation. Accordingly,
a driver who submitted to the chemical test and was found "under the
influence" and convicted could still drive immediately after his convic-
tion, even though the "emergency" doctrine's primary purpose is to
keep this class of driver off the road.
Even if the state were to revoke the licenses of all persons con-
victed of DWI, so long as the suspect submits to the test, the
revocation will not take place until later, following conviction
on the charge upon a full trial and hearing. . . . If there is
time to permit pre-revocation adjudication for the driver
found presumptively under the influence of alcohol, then
there is no reason why the same opportunity should not be
afforded the driver who refuses the test.
49
Providing the final straw that breaks the "emergency" doctrine's
back, is the simple logic that, where the penalty period for refusal is
fixed, as it is in Oklahoma, the general public will be protected from
the refusing driver for the axtc period of time whether or not
that period of revocation begins before or after a proper notice and
hearing is received by the motorist.
A recent case at the district court level in Tulsa County, Okla-
homa. declared the Oklahoma implied consent statute unconstitutional
for failing to provide due process, citing Bell, Chavez, and Holland v.
Parker5 ° as the authorities.-" It remains to be seen what the higher
level tribunals in Oklahoma will do with the well reasoned decision,
particularly in light of the similarities between the Oklahoma statute
and the now defunct South Dakota version of implied consent.
The remaining segment of section 753 has also been a source of
repeated litigation. It raises questions about the interpretation of the
phrase "refuses to submit to chemical testing." One of these questions
concerns the right to counsel. It is very often the case that the driver
insists upon consulting with legal counsel before either submitting to
a test or deciding which test to elect. The courts have uniformly held
that there is no right to counsel at these stages of the custody. The
usual reason given is that the sixth amendment provides for the right
to counsel in criminal cases but not civil.5 2 A more pragmatic ground
for denying the right to counsel at the testing stage is that, because
49. Ibid.
50. 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973).
51. Dablemont v. Dep't of Public Safety, No. C-73-1338 (Tulsa Cty, decided
Nov. 1, 1973).
52. 501 P.2d at 1103.
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of the rapidity with which the body rids itself of alcohol, it is not feas-
ible to require law enforcement authorities to wait until the defendant's
attorney arrives and a decision is made whether or not to take the
test.
5 3
The bifurcated (civil and criminal) nature of implied consent stat-
utes has created a great deal of confusion for operators unfamiliar with
their rights to counsel. Technically, because criminal charges can re-
sult from the roadside arrest, the Miranda warnings are required to be
given by the officer.54  This gives the unwary driver the strong impres-
sion that he does have a right to counsel immediately and that he might
well be vindicated in a court of law for having stood up for his rights.
A few recent California decisions illustrate the point. In these cases,
the courts did not suspend the motorists' licenses for their refusal to
submit, because the confusion created by the Miranda warnings was the
fault of the officer and therefore it was his duty to explain to the sus-
pects their actual rights. 5 The Oklahoma view is that the Miranda
warnings are not necessary for implied consent arrests because the
chemical testing procedures do not involve the threat of a compulsory
means of self-incrimination.
5 6
The issue of "refusal" takes on many different forms. The
Application of Kunneman57 is a fine example of a non-verbal refusal.
There, the defendant orally agreed to submit to a breath test at the
police station, but given repzated opportunities to blow into the breath-
alyzer device as instructed, he sucked on the mouthpiece instead. This
conduct was deemed a refusal under section 753.58
Other cases have designated various acts as refusal, including
53. Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
54. The warnings derived from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are:
1. right to remain silent;
2. anything said may be used against the speaker;
3. right to the presence of an attorney;
4. an attorney may be appointed if the defendant cannot otherwise afford counsel.
55. Rust v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1968); Plumb v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, I Cal. App. 3d 256, 81 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1969); Kingston v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1949). But see Lacy v. Orr, 81 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1969); Largomarsino v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 81 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1969)
(where there was no proof that the driver was misled or confused by the Miranda warn-
ings and suspension of license was affirmed).
56. State v. Carson, 512 P.2d 825 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
57. 501 P.2d 910 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972).
58. See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Finley
v. Orr, 262 Cal. App. 2d 656, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1968); State v. Hurbean, 230 Ohio
App. 2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 290 (1970).
1975] 409
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss3/6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:398
delay in agreeing to submit,c" excessive intoxication," and sometimes
physical or medical inability to perform the tests."' Several Oklahoma
cases state that the admission of the fact of a defendant's refusal into
evidence at a criminal trial is reversible error.
2
Section 754 outlines the initial appellate steps available to a driver
whose license has been revoked pursuant to the implied consent pro-
visions. 63 As noted previously, the matter of questionable due process
pervades this whole area of the statute's administration. The hearing
called for by this section is not automatic but occurs only upon due and
timely demand of the motorist. The section then permits the hearing
of only three pertinent issues before the Commissioner of Public Safety
or his agent:
(1) Whether the person had been driving or was in actual
physical control of a vehicle upon the public highways
while under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating
liquor
(2) Whether the person was placed under arrest
(3) Whether he refused to submit to the test or tests
59. Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1968); Kruger v.
Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875 (Iowa 1969); Sweeney v. Tofany, 56 Misc. 2d 291, 288 N.Y.S.
2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
60. Groff v. Rice, 20 Ohio App. 2d 309, 49 Ohio Op. 2d 400, 253 N.E.2d 318
(1969); Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 788, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1968); State v. Nor-
mandin, 284 Minn. 24, 169 N.W.2d 222 (1969).
61. Application of Scott, 5 A.2d 859, 171 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1958) (where motorist's
false teeth kept getting in the way as he tried to blow up test balloon); Burson v. Col-
lier, 226 Ga. 427, 175 S.E.2d 660 (1970) (emphysema prevented driver from being
able to blow up balloon). In cases like these where the refusal can be shown to be
other than willful, courts are apparently going to be less strict in imposing the penalties
for "refusal".
62. Morris v. State, 497 P.2d 1108 (Okla. 1972); Martin v. State, 487 P.2d 1179
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971). A brief discussion of this point can be found at 10 OIMA.
L. REV. 331 (1957). The essence of the majority judicial opinions has been that com-
mentary on the defendant's refusal could make him the victim of prejudice in the verdict
of a jury, created by no real facts produced by the chemical test.
63. The statute provides:
Upon the written request of a person whose privilege to drive has been revoked
or denied the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety shall grant the person
an opportunity to be heard within ten days after the receipt of the request, but
the request must be made within thirty days after the revocation. The hearing
shall be before the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety or his authorized
agent, in the county wherein the alleged events occurred for which the person
was arrested, unless the Oklahoma Commissioner of Public Safety or his au-
thorized agent and the person agree that the hearing may be held in some
other county. The hearing shall be transcribed and its scope shall cover the is-
sues of (1) whether tha person had been driving or was in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle upon the public highways while under the influence of alcohol
or intoxicating liquor, (2) whether the person was placed under arrest and (3)
whether he refused to submit to the test or tests. Whether thp Person wa in-
formed that his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied If he refused to
submit to the test or tests shall not be an issue. (emphasis and enumeration
added for convenience of reference).
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In the adversary ventilation of each of these allowable points of conten-
tion, it is not unlikely that the appellant would feel at a real disadvan-
tage.
The hearing on the first issue, the matter of driving under the in-
fluence when apprehended, goes to the showing of probable cause for
the arrest and not to the actual charge of DWI. This stage of the hear-
ing is very likely to break down into a swearing match between the
officer and the driver, unless there were witnesses. And even if there
were, there is a real danger here because the fact-finder is not a civil
judge, but rather is an administrative officer belonging often to the
same department as the arresting officer. 64  Cross-examination is very
helpful in this sensitive area but is feasible only if the motorist can af-
ford legal assistance.
The remaining issues of the hearing are subject to the same
criticism. All of the intricacies of arrest, especially the many facets
of Miranda, are theoretically contestable at this point, and yet the ul-
timate decision at this level will be made by a non-judicial employee
of the state.
Aside from these individual weaknesses with the procedure, -t
most flagrant abuse, the area deserving the most critical comment, is
the concept of statutorily limiting the scope of the hearing to just three
"black and white" issues. In addition, section 754 expressly excludes
consideration of whether a warning was given, an omission which com-
pounds the likelihood that the result will be something less than the
fair and just hearing promised by the Anglo-American tradition. There
appears to be a cold lack of sensitivity and reality to the hearings pre-
scribed in section 754. In view of the genuine mixed sentiments about
due process in the implied consent statute generally, it would be wise
for the legislature to inject some humanity into the section by per-
mitting some reasonable deviations from the present three-issue limita-
tion.
Section 755 offers a second, higher level appeal to the county
court for the penalized motorist.65 From an examination of the Okla-
homa cases construing this provision, there appears to be a great deal
64. A student studies this problem in a comment entitled California's Implied Con-
sent Statute: An Examination & Evaluation, 1 LOYOLA U.L. REv. (L.A.) 23 (1968).
65. The statute provides:
If the revocation or denial is sustained, the person whose license or permit to
drive or nonresident operating privilege has been revoked or denied may file a
petition for appeal in the county court in the manner provided in 47 O.S., Sec-
tion 6-211, and the proceedings upon said appeal shall be the proceedings pre-
scribed by 47 O.S., Section 6-211.
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of uncertainty regarding the breadth and scope of the appellate hearing
prescribed.
The procedure for entry into and conduct within the appeal is
derived from section 6-211 of title 47, a provision developed specially
for motor vehicle case appeals. Part (e) of this enactment states:
Upon said hearing said court shall take testimony and examine
into the facts and circumstances, including all of the records
on file in the office of the Department of Public Safety rela-
tive to the offense committed and the driving record of said
licensee, and determine from said facts, circumstances and rec-
ords whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or shall be
subject to the order of denial, cancellation, suspension or
revocation issued by the Department. The court may also
determine whether, from such testimony of said licensee's prev-
ious driving record in the operation of motor vehicles, said
order was for a longer period of time than such facts and cir-
cumstances warranted. In case the court finds that said order
was not justified, the court may sustain said appeal, vacate the
order of the Department and direct said license restored to the
petitioner. The court may, in case it determines the order
was justified, but that the period of suspension was excessive,
enter an order modifying the same. (emphasis added).
From a reading of this section it seems clear that the scope of the
county court proceeding will be significantly broader than the three-
issue lower level hearing. However, in construing the statutes (section
6-211, section 754, and section 755) in pari materia, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v.
Kopczynski, 6 reversed a district court decision which modified the
operator's period of revocation from six months to 30 days, holding that
the district court had no more discretion under section 6-211 than did
the Department of Public Safety in the first hearing. The decision
therefore intends to limit the scope of hearing pursuant to section 6-
211 to the same prescribed issues and factors permissible under section
753 and section 754. As a result, because the six month period is a
fixed feature of section 753, the district court had no authority to
modify the period to less than six months.
0 7
This reasoning, keeping in mind the language of section 6-211
and the wording of section 755 ("and the proceedings upon said appeal
shall be the proceedings prescribed by 47 O.S., Section 6-21 1") is very
inadequate indeed. If it is a matter of interpreting legislative intent,
66. 499 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1972).
67. Lewis v. Dep't of Public Safety, 506 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); In re Finley, 503
P.2d 1273 (Okla. 1972).
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it would have been simple for the legislature to indicate its desire for
another limited hearing. Clearly they intended to expand the hearing
at this level by placing at the disposal of the appellant the machinery
of section 6-211 with its sweeping power of review.
Illustrating the confusion within the judiciary regarding the mean-
ing of section 755 is the case of Application of Kunneman.68 This
court held that the admission into civil evidence of the tact that the
motorist vomited in jail after refusing to submit -to a chemical test, was
not reversible error. Surely this type of information is not relevant to
the three limited issues outlined in section 754, but here the court took
notice of the differences between that proceeding and the one in sec-
tion 6-211, and after a thorough review of the record, upheld the revo-
cation. Even though the evidence of the vomiting was unquestionably
damaging to the operator and only tenuously related to the scope of
a revocation hearing, this court read the probable intent of the legisla-
ture more accurately in applying section 6-211 broadly, than did the
Kopczynski court. 9
CONCLUSION
There are few, if any, persons who would advocate doing away
with implied consent statutes entirely. The drunk driver situation in
America is too serious to justify taking such a proven weapon away
from law enforcement officials charged with combatting the problem
on a day to day basis. Unfortunately, legislatures in general have been
too hasty and negligent in constructing these weapons. In their zeal
to rid the community of the dangerous drunk driver, the legislative
creations known as "implied consent statutes" have generated possibly
greater dangers that affect our fundamental rights and liberties.
Oklahoma has acted prudently in adopting the concept of the im-
plied consent doctrine to alleviate the drunk driving anathema in this
state. But much more needs to be done to protect its citizens from the
presently overbearing features of our enacted statute. Oklahoma must
68. 501 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1972).
69. The preceding section by section analysis of the Oklahoma implied consent stat-
ute was intended to concentrate on the civil matters raised by the statute. These sec-
tions discussed are accompanied by four other sections consecutively in the statutes. By
their titles, they deal with:
Admission of evidence (criminal setting) shown by tests, OKRA. STAT. tit. 47,
§ 756 (1971).
Other competent evidence-Admissibility, OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 757 (1971).
Nonresidents-Notice to other states, OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 758 (1971).
Board of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Influence-Methods-Permits, OLA.
STAT. tit. 47, § 759 (1971).
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not allow its good intentions to turn sour because of a few provisions
in the statute that are rectifiable at no, cost to the statute's overall
purpose.
Primarily, the due process enigma must be resolved. The old
stumbling block that due process need not apply to "privileges" as op-
posed to "rights" has at last been overcome by the tenor of recent Su-
preme Court cases. These decisions make it clear that wherever it is
possible to prevent an unjust and unnecessary deprivation of a property
interest, the Supreme Court will find a way to do it. The Bell decision,
involving a motor vehicle statute, anticipates a strict due process ap-
proach to implied consent. Its effect can be seen already in the swift
incorporation of its language and authority in the Chavez and Dable-
mont lower court decisions.
It is time for Oklahoma to revise its statute to provide, along the
lines of the California version, the essential prior notice and pre-revoca-
tion hearing that minimal procedural due process demands. The
"emergency" doctrine cannot be relied on to justify non-revision. Too
many faulty presumptions and inconsistencies erode that rationale.
Besides, it is important to note that guaranteeing due process as
suggested does nothing to affect adversely the purposes and goals of
the implied consent statute. Penalties will be meted out just as before,
and even stricter ones may be justified. The sole change will be that
the penalty will be invoked only after all is said and done for the
record.
The due process revisions will necessitate conforming alterations
in other areas. These include the opening up of the currently limited
adversary hearing to all reasonably contestable issues encompassed by
the statute. Another improvement will call for requiring that the
ramifications of a refusal to take a chemical test be made clear to the
suspected motorist in custody. Implied consent is so novel in its con-
ception and implications for the average citizen who confronts it that
requiring a simple sentence by the arresting officer, even as perfunc-
torily performed as are the Miranda warnings, will better enlist the sup-
port of those persons who are now uneasy about the statute.
Oklahoma is a neophyte in the implied consent field; many states
have long had similar statutes. For the most part, these other states
have, in response to decisional law, incorporated into their statutes the
features necessary to make them more palatable in the traditional
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